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Do the Means Change the Ends? Express
Entry and Economic Immigration in Canada

The relationship between economy and community is a constitutive tension in the
Canadian immigration state. With the rise of the knowledge economy, Canada
mediated this tension through the concept of human capital, internalized in the points
system. Introduced in 2015, Express Entry transformed the landscape of economic
immigration in Canada. Express Entry is an online permanent residence application
system. In this article, I argue that Express Entry is more than a change in form
and process; it is a change in substance that shifts Canada’s skilled immigration
regime toward a neo-corporatist model. By shifting partial decision-making authority
to the provinces and territories, on the one hand, and to the labour market, on the
other, Express Entry rebalances the relationship between the federal government
and private and sub-state parties. Furthermore, it accomplishes this rebalancing
through the use of Ministerial Instructions, themselves a unique instrument which
raise democratic transparency and accountability concerns.

La relation entre économie et communauté est une tension constitutive de la
situation en matière d’immigration au Canada. Avec l’essor de l’économie du savoir,
le Canada a joué un rôle de médiateur dans cette tension par le biais du concept
de capital humain, intériorisé dans le système de points. Lancé en 2015, le service
Entrée express a transformé le paysage de l’immigration économique au Canada.
Entrée express est un système de demande de résidence permanente en ligne. Dans
cet article, je soutiens qu’’Entrée express est plus qu’un changement de forme et
de processus; c’est un changement de fond qui fait passer le régime d’immigration
des travailleurs qualiﬁés du Canada à un modèle néo-corporatiste. En transférant le
pouvoir décisionnel partiel aux provinces et aux territoires, d’une part, et au marché
du travail, d’autre part, Entrée express rééquilibre la relation entre le gouvernement
fédéral et les parties privées et infra-étatiques. En outre, il procède à ce rééquilibrage
par le biais d’instructions ministérielles, un instrument unique en son genre qui soulève
des préoccupations en matière de transparence démocratique et de responsabilité.

*
Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. This article
greatly bene¿ted from the research assistance of Lucie Krajca and Dylan Williams, the helpful
comments of two anonymous reviewers, and especially from the close reading of Colin Grey.
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While economic priorities are often the central drivers of policy,
immigration is always also about claims to membership in a political
community.

Introduction: Canada’s story of economic immigration
,Q PDQ\ ZD\V HFRQRPLF LPPLJUDWLRQ WHOOV WKH FRQVWLWXWLYH VWRU\ RI WKH
&DQDGLDQ VHWWOHU VWDWH 6KRUWO\ DIWHU SDVVLQJ WKH Constitution Act, 1867
3DUOLDPHQWSDVVHGWKHImmigration Act, 1869ZKLFKJUDQWHGWKH&DELQHW
SRZHU WR UHJXODWH LPPLJUDWLRQ WKURXJK 2UGHUVLQ&RXQFLO 7KUHH \HDUV
ODWHU&DQDGDVHWRXWDGPLVVLRQVFULWHULDIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHEDQQLQJFULPLQDOV
IURPHQWU\6RHPHUJHGRQHRIWKHGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHVRI&DQDGLDQQDWLRQDO
LGHQWLW\ WKH LQH[WULFDELOLW\ RI LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG QDWLRQEXLOGLQJ /RQJ
EHIRUH WKHVH OHJLVODWLYH PHDVXUHV KRZHYHU ODERXUHUV ZHUH LPPLJUDWLQJ
 7ULDGD¿ORV7ULDGD¿ORSRXORVHGWanted and Welcome? Policies for Highly Skilled Immigrants
in Comparative Perspective 6SULQJHU1HZ<RUN DW
 6HH&DWKHULQH'DXYHUJQHThe New Politics of Immigration and the End of the Settler State 1HZ
<RUN&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 

'RWKH0HDQV&KDQJHWKH(QGV"([SUHVV(QWU\
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informally and under bilateral treaty arrangements.3 These mostly Chinese
workers built the country’s transcontinental railroad and worked in its mines
and ¿sheries, only to have their immigration restricted upon the railroad’s
completion in 1885 with the enactment of the Chinese Immigration Act.4
This legislation, widely known as the Chinese head tax, has become an
apologue in the Canadian historical narrative, a cautionary and regrettable
tale about avarice and racism. But have these twin exigencies disappeared
from immigration policymaking or do they, distasteful though they might
be, represent the historical articulation of the ongoing tension between
economy and community in matters of immigration? In this article, I argue
that the relationship between economy and community is a constitutive
tension in the Canadian immigration state, and that the introduction of the
Express Entry regime for selecting economic immigrants represents yet
another iteration of this tension by reinforcing the “rational, managerial,
and economic focus” of immigration controls.5
The demands of the settler state meant that Canada understood quickly
that economic immigration constructs the material and demographic
nation, simultaneously building the physical economy and the national
population. ReÀecting this understanding, the dynamics of immigration
have shifted signi¿cantly since the early days of nation building. Over
Canada’s immigration history, the pendulum has swung between selecting
immigrants based on the needs of the labour market and selecting them based
on considerations of national community. Today, the immigration state has
a more complicated regulatory apparatus at its ¿ngertips that it uses to
direct a regime of strati¿ed mobility: attracting the best and excluding the
rest.6 Countries vie to attract talented economic immigrants by holding out
special bene¿ts at the same time that they refuse, interdict, and deport less
desirable immigrants.7 With the rise of the knowledge economy, Canada
mediated the tension between economy and community by the concept
3.
See David Scott Fitzgerald & David Cook-Martin, Culling the Masses (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2014) at 145.
4.
See Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian
Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 94-98; Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin,
supra note 3 at 148-149.
5.
James P Walsh, “Quantifying Citizens: Neoliberal Restructuring and Immigrant Selection in
Canada and Australia” (2011) 15:6-7 Citizenship Studies 861 at 864.
6.
See Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi, eds, Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and
Membership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) especially at 187 and c 9; Eleanore Kofman,
“Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity” (2005) 9:5 Citizenship Studies 453.
7.
See Ayelet Shachar, “Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent”
(2011) 120 Yale L J 2088; Sandra Lavenex, “The Competition State and Multilateral Liberalization of
Highly Skilled Migration” in Michael Peter Smith & Adrian Favell, eds, The Human Face of Global
Mobility (New York: Routledge, 2006) at 29.
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of human capital, understood as the sum total of an individual’s skills,
knowledge, and experience. Internalized in the Canadian points system
and exalted as the predictor of economic success and social adaptability,
human capital has functioned as a signi¿er for the productivity of future
citizens. In recent years, however, the role for human capital has shifted
as Canada’s economic immigration programs undergo signi¿cant changes.
To place this in context, economic immigrants constitute over half of
the country’s annual immigration target of approximately 300,000 people,
making them the largest category of entrants.8 However, scholarship about
economic immigration tends to focus on its extremes. At one pole is the
highly mobile pool of global talent: cosmopolitan migrants whom states
lure with promises of prestigious positions and accelerated citizenship.9
At the other pole is the less mobile pool of temporary unskilled labourers,
the precarious workers whom states desperately need but refuse to keep.10
While scholarship focuses on these extremes, the majority of the 156,000
economic immigrants admitted to Canada each year are actually skilled
workers and their accompanying family members.11 In other words, the
wide and squishy middle of the economic immigration hierarchy generates
most of Canada’s economic immigrants. This broad middle used to be
pulled into the country through the points system, which calculated the
human capital and adaptability of skilled workers based on a numerical
points assessment. However, over the past decade, economic immigration
to Canada has stealthily changed form, culminating in the Express Entry
system.
The advent of Express Entry in January 2015, though not dismantling
the points system, signi¿cantly shifted its shape and content, none of
which is readily apparent from a close reading of the legislation. The
government agency in charge of immigration, Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), suggests that Express Entry is largely a

8.
See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017 Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration, Minister: the Hon Ahmed D Hussen (Ottawa: IRCC, 2017) [IRCC 2017 Annual Report].
9.
See Ayelet Shachar, “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration
Regimes” (2006) 81:1 NYUL Rev 148; Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo,
2nd ed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
10. See Faye Faraday, Pro¿ting from the Precarious: How Recruitment Practices Exploit Migrant
Workers (Toronto: Metcalfe Foundation, 2014); Faye Faraday, Made in Canada: How the Law
Constructs Migrant Workers’ Insecurity (Toronto: Metcalfe Foundation, 2012); Sarah Marsden,
Enforcing Exclusion: Precarious Migrants and the Law in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018);
Luin Goldring & Patricia Landolt, eds, Producing and Negotiating Non-Citizenship: Precarious Legal
Status in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), c 4.
11. See IRCC Canada 2017 Annual Report, supra note 8.
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change in form.12 But all good students of critical legal studies know that
form changes substance. Indeed, parts of the legal scaffolding of Express
Entry render the online intake management system—the eligibility stage,
which will be explored further in the second section of this paper—far
more signi¿cant than it initially appears. Not only does Express Entry
rebalance the relationship between the federal government and private
and sub-state parties, it accomplishes this rebalancing through the use
of Ministerial Instructions, themselves a unique policy instrument which
raise democratic transparency and accountability concerns. The means of
Express Entry thus mark a shift in ends. This shift sounds in two registers:
the means of creating Express Entry through Ministerial Instructions
and the means of selecting economic immigrants internal to the Express
Entry regime. These means change the relationship between economy and
community, moving us further toward an immigration model of people as
economic market outputs and further away from people as political and
social members in a national community.
Part I begins with an analysis of Canada’s story of economic
immigration. In this Part, I brieÀy review the history of economic immigrants
in the Canadian state and then turn to situating the Canadian model among
the various typologies of economic immigration. This section focuses
on the historical turn away from the labour market and the theoretical
turn toward human capital. The human capital model, expressed in the
points system, dominated economic immigration discourse in Canada
and beyond for at least three decades. This section analyzes the meaning
of human capital in the international mobility context and the balance
of economy and community internalized there. The concept of human
capital in the points system sought to calibrate short-term labour ¿t with
long-term citizenship by including measures of personal attributes such
as age and adaptability. The points system suffered some poor outcomes,
however, and the rise of Express Entry marks a turn away from human
capital (although it retains the points system and layers another on top, as
explained in Part II) and toward the national and regional labour markets.
Part II provides a comprehensive description of the Express Entry
system. This description, while sometimes technical, is necessary to
understand the analysis that follows. A robust academic explanation of
the law and operation of Express Entry has not yet been published, and
12. This language pervades government documents about the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP).
See, e.g., Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 7KH ([SUHVV (QWU\ <HDU(QG 5HSRUW
 (Ottawa: IRCC, 2017) [EE Year-End Report 2016] (“Express Entry is Canada’s application
management system”). The Liberal government changed the name of Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) soon after taking of¿ce.
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scholars remain confused about which parts of the original points system
survive and where they reside. Moreover, although both the points system
and the Express Entry regime are juridical creations, the bulk of academic
analysis about them is produced by other disciplines, notably political
science. This Part contributes to legal understandings of the text and
operation of the Express Entry system. It also provides the foundation
for considering how changes to the selection mode and criteria for entry
of economic immigrants has repercussions both for lawmaking processes
and the distribution of legal authority, examined in Part III, and for the
relationship between economy and community in the immigration state.
In Part III, I examine the more profound changes accomplished by
the Express Entry regime. Based on the operational framework laid out
in Part II, I critically examine the legal creation of Express Entry (the
basis of its legal authority) and the legal decision makers instantiated by
it (the distribution of its legal authority). The former focuses on the legal
scaffolding of the Express Entry regime as created through the instrument
of Ministerial Instructions, while the latter focuses on the shift of decisionmaking authority to employers and provinces. Express Entry marks a
fundamental shift in both the role of the Canadian federal government in
selecting immigrants and its historically more consultative processes of
immigration lawmaking. This is much more than a swing of the pendulum
toward the labour market. If indeed “immigration is the last bastion
of sovereignty” and the core of that sovereignty is the ability to pick
members, then permitting employers and provinces to choose immigrants
loosens the knot between immigration and nation-building.13 The nature of
decentralizing admissions decisions in this manner means that the federal
government loses control over selection criteria. Moreover, at the same
time that decision making authority was devolved, the rise of Ministerial
Instructions removed the capacity for public participation in immigration
policymaking. Together, these changes suggest that the values conveyed by
Express Entry suggest a different, less signi¿cant role for the community
and citizen in the immigration selection process. The article then concludes
with some thoughts about the constitutive tension between economy and
community in our ever-evolving knowledge society.
I. (PERGLHGHFRQRPLFV"7KHSRLQWVV\VWHPLQSHUVSHFWLYH
Following the concept of human capital through recent Canadian history
reveals its established role as a backbone of economic immigrant selection
as well as its changing shape over time. As part of broader efforts to
13.

Catherine Dauvergne, 0DNLQJ3HRSOH,OOHJDO (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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compare economic immigration laws across countries, the International
Organization of Migration and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development distinguish between two models of skilled immigration:
supply-driven systems (human capital selection) and demand-driven
systems (employer selection).14 The variable in these models is the
selector and, implicitly, the selection criteria. Rey Koslowski suggests
an intervening third model, the QHRFRUSRUDWLVWPRGHO, which is based on
government selection of immigrants using a points system with extensive
business and labour participation.15 The neo-corporatist model lies between
the KXPDQ FDSLWDO PRGHO, which is based on government selection of
immigrants using a points system, and the GHPDQGGULYHQPRGHO, which is
based on employer selection of immigrants. The former Canadian points
system model was the prototype of the human capital model; the United
States is the prototype for the demand-driven model; and Australia was
Koslowski’s catalyst for the hybrid neo-corporatist model.16 As Canada
has re¿ned its human capital approach over time, so too has it moved
along this continuum toward the neo-corporatist model.
Neo-corporatism is a political economy approach to state-society
relations that is based on a system of interest representation.17 Typically,
it requires direct participation by civil society intermediary groups.18
When applied to the immigration context, neo-corporatism focuses on
the way that states “manage the pressures deriving from transnational
and international constraints with the structure of interests internal to
the receiving society.”19 It is most applicable in the context of economic
immigration where business interests seek to represent their labour needs
in state fora. Both as a theory and a framework, neo-corporatism adds
third parties back into immigration policymaking where they may have
been absent before. I use the term “third parties” broadly to refer to both
sub-state and non-state actors in order to mark distinctions from former
14. See Anna Boucher & Lucie Cerna, “Current Policy Trends in Skilled Immigration Policy”
(2014) 52:3 Intl Migration 21.
15. Rey Koslowski, “Selective Migration Policy Models and Changing Realities of Implementation”
(2014) 52:3 Intl Migration 26 at 27.
16. ,ELG
17. Philippe C Schmitter, “Neo-Corporatism” in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo
Morlino, eds, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QF\FORSHGLDRI3ROLWLFDO6FLHQFH (USA: Sage Publications, 2011). It is
often juxtaposed to pluralism, which envisions a more spontaneous and episodic relationship between
groups and the state.
18. Éric Montpetit, “Can Québec Neo-Corporatist Networks Withstand Canadian Federalism and
Internationalization” in Alain Gagnon, ed, 4XHEHF6WDWHDQG6RFLHW\ (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004).
19. Giuseppe Sciortino, “Toward a Political Sociology of Entry Policies: Conceptual Problems and
Theoretical Proposals” (2010) 26:2 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 213 at 218.
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centralized models of federal immigration jurisdiction. As an ideal-typical
model, neo-corporatism illuminates the marked and growing space for
labour market interests in immigration policymaking.
For Koslowski, Australia is the ideal-typical model of neo-corporatism
because “government, industry, and labour collectively shape immigration
policy much like “neo-corporatist” economic development strategies.”20
These models require some disaggregation, as Koslowski recognizes
but does not undertake, in order to understand their arterial pathways.
This disaggregation runs along four axes: Who triggers the immigration
process? Who selects? According to what criteria? Who sets the selection
criteria and how? The answers to these questions will not always be
straightforward, but provide insight into how large or small the role for
economic interests in immigration matters. As a lens on the shifting
relationship between economy and community, neo-corporatism captures
the tenor of the new Express Entry system. It adds rigour to the claim that
Express Entry has shifted all of the axes of economic immigration closer
to the market-oriented, demand-driven pole.
Canada has a long history of business interests setting immigration
priorities.21 Starting with the Canadian Paci¿c Railway agreement in 1880,
industrialists earnestly promoted immigration as a source of labour.22
Although business support would wax and wane in tandem with xenophobic
sentiments, business interests tended to prioritize labour. The years leading
up to World War II focused on maintaining a homogeneous society by
growing the population in line with racial and national origin restrictions.
After World War II, sponsored family immigrants dominated admissions
while the economy grew.23 Finally, in 1967, the Canadian government
ended formal discrimination.24 The priority of economy returned to the
forefront with the Liberal Government’s White Paper on immigration

20. Koslowski, VXSUD note 15 at 27.
21. See Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin, VXSUD note 3 at 143-144.
22. Kelley & Trebilcock, VXSUD note 4 at 94-95; Valerie Knowles, 6WUDQJHUVDWRXU*DWHV&DQDGLDQ
,PPLJUDWLRQDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ3ROLF\± (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016) at 72, referring to contract
with Andrew Onderdonk for western CPR construction in 1880. See also articles of agreement
introduced by Sir Charles Tupper in Royal Commission, “Report on the Canadian Paci¿c Railway”
vol III (1882) at 22-23.
23. See Edwina O’Shea, “Missing the Point(s): The Declining Fortunes of Canada’s Economic
Immigration Programs” (2009) Transatlantic Academy Paper Series at 4.
24. The move was underway with the 1962 Order in Council and amended Immigration Regulations,
but those reforms left administrative discretion to discriminate intact. See Triada¿lopoulos,VXSUD note
1 at 23-28. Finally, the 1967 Immigration Regulations marked the introduction of the points system
and the end of ethnic selection.
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policy in 1966.25 Its recommendations reconnected immigration to the
labour market and eliminated discrimination by employing objective
criteria to assess skills and experiences. The resulting points system for
independent immigrants then governed Canadian immigration law for the
next ¿fty years.26
1. 7KHJUDGXDOHQWUHQFKPHQWRIKXPDQFDSLWDO
Canada is widely celebrated in immigration circles for pioneering the points
system, which was designed to measure the human capital of economic
immigrants. The points system sought to assess potential for successful
establishment in Canada.27 It solicited educated and adaptable immigrants
who could function as nimble and Àexible inputs in the domestic labour
market: ¿lling gaps, rising through the ranks, and seamlessly shifting
between ¿rms. The points model has been emulated in other countries
of immigration, including Australia, adopted in modi¿ed form in several
other countries such as Denmark, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom,
and perennially debated in the United States and lately in Germany.28 Most
recently, however, Canada stands at the vanguard (after New Zealand and
Australia) in segueing the points system into a hybrid labour market driven
model of selection.
The points system represented the culmination of several currents in
Canadian immigration law. First, it marked the shift from a sponsorship
dominated kinship-based admission cohort to an economics-based
admissions cohort. Second, it signaled a move from the short-term
assessment of labour market needs to the longer-term assessment of
employability and societal integration. Third, it clearly expressed the
human capital approach to immigration selection, combining potential
economic contribution and social integration in a set of selection factors.
Far from static, the points categories and their allocations expressed
different socio-political relationships to the labour market over time.
In its 1967 initial incarnation, the points system combined two sets
of attributes: human capital factors, such as education and language, and
labour market factors.29 They were linked by the criteria of “occupational
demand”—which was measured according to a list prepared by the
25. See Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, :KLWH 3DSHU RQ ,PPLJUDWLRQ, and
Wallace B Chung & Madeline H Chung Collection (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) [White Paper].
26. See PC 1967-1616, (1967) C Gaz II, vol 96, no 3, 1350-62.
27. See O’Shea,VXSUD note 23 at 4.
28. Ayelet Shachar, “The Brave New World of Strati¿ed Mobility” in Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi, eds,
0LJUDWLRQLQ3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\7KH(WKLFVRI0RYHPHQWDQG0HPEHUVKLS (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016) at 181-182.
29. O’Shea, VXSUD note 23 at 4.

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

Department of Manpower and Immigration—and “speci¿c vocational
preparation,” which assessed training for the occupation.30 Under that
system, labour market factors accounted for 35 points and human capital
factors were worth a possible total of 40 points, with the passmark set
at 50 points.31 The 1967 regulations also granted 15 points for “personal
suitability” and 35 to 50 points for the presence of a family member, factors
which could clearly tip the balance.32 The 1978 regulations maintained
the passmark but reversed the balance in the selection factors, offering
up to 48 points for labour market factors, and 32 points for human capital
factors.33 The increased value of labour market factors was primarily due
to the introduction of the work experience factor and the increase of points
available for speci¿c vocational training and education.
The economic downturn in the early 1980s prompted the reduction
of the number of independent immigrants by introducing the requirement
of an approved job offer. This requirement was lifted in 1986, shifting
selection points from occupational demand to language, reduced the
assisted relative factor, and raised the passmark to 70 points, amid
renewed attention to the integration of economic immigrants.34 Again in
1992, triggered by concern about the need for an educated workforce in
the knowledge economy, the government reemphasized the human capital
factors.35 These amendments raised the number of points available for
education, adding more points for university or postsecondary credentials
and speci¿c vocational preparation. As Edwina O’Shea concludes:
Taken together with the 1986 measures, the effect was by 1993 to
move a considerable distance away from the original vision of the 1978
regulations, with increasing emphasis placed on core human capital
factors—language and education – and less weight given to the role of
the labour market.36

The move from occupational demand factors toward human capital
factors can be seen as rooting the value of the economic immigrant “¿rst
and foremost in the individual’s personal attributes, rather than in his or

30. Ibid at 5.
31. See Alan G Green & David A Green, “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy,
Past and Present” (1999) 25(4) Can Public Policy 425; O’Shea, supra note 23 at 5.
32. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 5.
33. Ibid at 6; Immigration Regulations, SOR/78-172, s 42.
34. See O’Shea, ibid at 8.
35. Ibid; Canada, Bill C-86, An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and Other Acts in Consequence
Thereof, 3rd Sess, 34th Parl, 1992, assented to on 27 December 1992.
36. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 10.
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her contributions as a worker per se.”37 These changes took hold in the
context of a more general effort to raise the absolute number of economic
immigrants and to adjust the balance between economic immigrants and
others in accordance with a 60:40 ratio.38
The next decade marked the pinnacle of the human capital model.
Despite suggestions from academics and government of¿cials that
recent economic immigrants were stumbling in the labour market, the
regulations promulgated under the 2002 legislation, the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA], doubled down on the human
capital framework.39 There was a shared belief among economists and
policymakers that micromanaging immigration based on labour market
demand was “ineffective and created unrealistic expectations among new
immigrants.”40 The resulting set of core competencies, which is still in use
today, valued language ability, education, age, occupational experience,
and adaptability. The “personal suitability” and “assisted relative” factors
were gone, both folded into “adaptability,” designed to measure potential
to adapt based on relatives in Canada or spousal work or study here. The
education factor was weighted in favour of post-secondary university
quali¿cations. The occupational experience factor was tied to listed skilled
occupations contained in the National Occupational Classi¿cation (NOC)
taxonomy.41 There was no direct assessment of labour market demand,
although an approved job offer could still garner 10 points. The focus
instead was on prior work experience in a skilled occupation.42 Education,
language, and work experience (human capital factors) could garner 70
points among them, while age and adaptability added another possible

37. Antje Ellerman, “Human Capital Citizenship and the Changing Logic of Immigrant Admissions”
(2019) J Ethnic & Migration Studies 1 at 11.
38. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 10-11.
39. The research showed that the temporary earnings gap between new immigrants and Canadianborn workers, which used to disappear over time, was becoming wider and narrowing more slowly
than before, see O’Shea, supra note 23 at 9. In the White Paper, supra note 25, that preceded the
IRPA, the government tied the occupational demand factor to the deteriorating outcomes of economic
immigrants.
40. O’Shea, supra note 23 at 12, citing Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Building a Strong
Foundation for 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation
(Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1998); Canada, Immigration Legislative Review,
Advisory Group, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration, Chair: Robert
Trempe (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), c 6, criticizing labour
market factors as disregarding the Àuidity of labour markets and arguing that occupation-based
selection did not prepare applicants well for establishing a life in Canada.
41. The NOC is a taxonomy of more than 30,000 occupations sorted in 500 Unit Groups and
organized according to skill levels and skill types.
42. O’Shea, supra note 23 at 13.
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20 points.43 These allocations reÀected a longer-term approach to labour
market success and social integration.
In 2002, applicants required a minimum of 75 points to qualify as skilled
workers eligible for permanent residency.44 In their 2002 instantiation,
“the IRPA selection factors represent an almost complete realization of a
‘human capital model’ for managing economic immigration.”45 It is true
that human capital factors pervaded the points system from its inception,
but for some scholars the human capital model assumed full form only
when the labour market demand factors were no longer a signi¿cant
part of the points calculus. Certainly, the 2002 points system sits at the
supply-side pole of the continuum: the immigration process is triggered
by the skilled worker applicant, who is selected by the federal government
according to its own points system criteria, which are largely insulated
from labour market demands. Since 2002, the government has amended
the points allocations, moving points from work experience to language
and age, introducing additional weight for the job offer in the adaptability
criteria (thus somewhat diluting the human capital approach), and setting
the pass mark at 67 points (see Figure 1).46
)LJXUH3RLQWV6\VWHP,PPLJUDWLRQDQG5HIXJHH3URWHFWLRQ5HJXODWLRQVVV
Education
Of¿cial Languages
Experience
Age
Arranged Employment
Adaptability

25 points
28 points
15 points
12 points
10 points
10 points

2. The measure of a human
The shift from industrial, resource-based economies to knowledge ones has
changed the type of economic immigrants that countries of immigration
seek to attract. Skilled workers, especially highly-skilled workers, are
the linchpins of the knowledge economy.47 The term “human capital”
seeks to identify and assemble these workers under its umbrella. In its
¿rst expression, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations described human

43. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].
44. Ibid, original version of regulations.
45. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 13.
46. IRPR, supra note 43.
47. De¿nitions of the highly skilled vary, but the most obvious markers are education and occupation.
There is an evolving consensus based on both tertiary education (meaning, completion of a formal
two-year college degree or more) and professional occupation. For example, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, together with Eurostat, developed a conceptual framework
called the Canberra Manual focused on the science and technology occupations.

'RWKH0HDQV&KDQJHWKH(QGV"([SUHVV(QWU\
DQG(FRQRPLF,PPLJUDWLRQLQ&DQDGD



capital as acquired and useful talents.48 Economists seized on the concept
of human capital again in the 1960s, reaf¿rming its ties to economic
growth.49 It has been usefully de¿ned as “the aggregation of the innate
abilities and the knowledge and skills that individuals acquire and develop
throughout their lifetime.”50 The immigration context prioritizes the
acquired skills component of this de¿nition of human capital, speci¿cally
intergenerational transfers of knowledge (including language), work
experience, and education. Notably, unlike physical capital, which is
readily transferable, human capital is inseparable from the human being.51
In the immigration context, it is precisely this embodied nature that
makes human capital such a powerful category. It is the idea that people add
capital to their minds and bodies through skills and knowledge acquisition.
This makes it uniquely suited to immigration because it travels easily with
the individual across the international border. The mobility of human
capital clari¿es the important distinction between human capital and
labour. For economists, the primary purpose of measuring and acquiring
human capital is to increase the productivity of labour, but human capital
and labour are not coeval.52 Human capital, understood as the stock of
skills and knowledge in an individual, adds value to labour and acts as an
input into labour productivity. It captures a number of pre-labour factors
such as education, language, and past experience that represent a more
holistic view of homo economicus. Under conditions of mobility, there
are two interpretations of human capital that shed light on its conceptual
value in selection processes.53 Theodore Schultz and Richard Nelson
and Edmund Phelps view human capital primarily as the capacity to
adapt. In their view, human capital is especially useful in dealing with
disequilibrium situations or changed environments (such as new country
settings). Meanwhile, Michael Spence views human capital as a signal of
ability rather than a set of independent characteristics that are useful in the
production process. For Spence, human capital metrics are signals about
some other characteristics of workers, such as motivation and discipline.
48. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 2 (1776).
49. See Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette & G C Ruggeri, “On the Concept and Dimensions of
Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context” (1999) 25:1 Can Pub Pol’y 87 at 87.
50. See ibid at 89.
51. See ibid at 90.
52. Paul M Johnson, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms (Auburn: Auburn University, 1994–
2005), online: <www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/human_capital> [perma.cc/KYD4-5QYX]; Arthur
O’Sullivan & Steven M. Sheffrin, Economics: Principles in Action (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 2003) at 5: “Human capital refers to the stock of skills and knowledge embodied in the ability to
perform labour so as to produce economic value.”
53. For a selection of interpretations of human capital, see Daron Acemoglu & David Autor, Lectures
in Labor Economics, online: <economics.mit.edu/¿les/4689> [perma.cc/6X3T-Y2TM].
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Taken together, these perspectives explain that the relationship between
human capital and labour productivity is not the whole picture; the metric
of human capital implicitly captures other characteristics and capacities,
ones that might facilitate integration into communities as much as markets.
In the immigration context, the concept of human capital underwrites
the points system and is used to assess immigrant potential for the primary
purpose of labour market integration, while still attuned to the immigrant’s
broader integration into society.54 As demonstrated by political theorists,
citizenship goes beyond bare legal status to encompass the political
dimension of governance and participation and the psychological dimension
of membership and belonging.55 The weight accorded to human capital
factors such as language skills, education, and adaptability criteria—
such as family connections and past Canadian education and work—are
directed toward these other dimensions of community and citizenship.
Walsh explains this relationship: “[t]he points systems directly reÀect such
concerns as credentials and other signs of human capital are constituted as
markers of personal initiative, self-improvement, risk-avoiding behavior
and other moral traits and ‘attributes which evidence a high degree of selfsuf¿ciency.’”56 These characteristics, while undoubtedly animated by the
state’s desire to help economic immigrants adjust to cyclical and structural
labour market changes,57 are nonetheless embodied and individualized,
and thus translatable into other domains. Stated differently, human
capital builds the community, too. Although the sole governing criterion
for selecting economic immigrants under the IRPA is their “ability to
become economically established in Canada,” embedded in the idea of
“establishment” are broader dimensions of citizenship.
In theory, human capital tries to gauge both economic potential and
social adaptability, acknowledging that human beings enter both an
economy and a community when they immigrate, and that success in
the former is intertwined with settlement in the latter. Economic success,
54. See Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism,
Employment Equity and Globalization (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002) at 79; Yasmeen AbuLaban, “Jean Chrétien’s Immigration Legacy” (2004) 9:1 Rev Const Stud 133.
55. Jean L Cohen, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos” (1999)
14:3 International Sociology 245; Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey
of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory” (1994) 104:2 Ethics 352; Joseph Carens, Culture, Citizenship,
and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000).
56. See Walsh, supra note 5 at 874.
57. On labour market changes, see Ana Ferrer, Garnett Picot & William Craig Riddell, “New
Directions in Immigration Policy: Canada’s Evolving Approach to the Selection of Economic
Immigrants” (2014) 48:3 Intl Migration Rev 846 at 850; Immigration Refugee Protection Act, SC
2001 c 27, s 12(2) [IRPA].
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however, proved elusive. This was not news to labour economists
or sociologists, who had warned of declining economic outcomes of
immigrants for over a decade.58 Almost at the same time that the IRPA
crystallized the human capital approach to economic immigration, the
data on deteriorating immigrant economic outcomes started to grow,
revealing problems of unemployment and underemployment that linked
up with concerns about brain waste.59 Several studies noted the rise in the
earnings gap between recent immigrants and Canadian born workers.60
They pointed to explanations “such as the changing source regions of
entering immigrants, declining returns to foreign labor market experience,
deterioration in the outcomes for new labor market entrants in general,
education quality, language skills, and sectoral economic downturns.”61
Ferrer et al. pointed out that language skills seem “to mediate the rate
of return to formal education” (immigrants with strong language skills
can more easily convert their education to earnings),62 however, the
“apocryphal immigrant taxi driver with a Ph.D.”63 became increasingly
real. Labour market discrimination combined with obstacles to foreign
credential recognition compounded the problem. Research suggested
that the latter were primarily due to provincial and independent licensing
bodies—problems of federalism and private sector professional regulation,
in other words, not problems squarely within the purview of immigration
law.64 Concurrently, the relatively low minimum pass mark of 67 and
administrative inef¿ciencies started to generate a growing backlog of
economic class applications.
There were several ad hoc responses to these concerns—initiatives
for foreign credential recognition, an uptick in the number of immigrants
admitted because they were nominated through provincial programs to
meet local labour-market needs, the expansion of the temporary foreign
58. See Ferrer, Picot & Riddell, supra note 57 at 850. See also Jeffrey G Reitz, “Immigration
Employment Success in Canada, Part II: Understanding the Decline” (2007) 8:1 Intl Migration &
Immigration 37; Statistics Canada, The Deteriorating Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible
Causes: Update 2005, by Garnett Picot & Arthur Sweetman, Analytical Studies Branch Research
Paper Series No 262 (Ottawa: Business Labour Market Analysis Division, Stats Can, 2005); James
T McDonald et al, Canadian Immigration: Economic Evidence for a Dynamic Policy Environment
(Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2010).
59. See Ferrer, Picot & Riddell, supra note 57 at 850. Note the temporal gap here: the data analyzes
immigrants who arrived before the human capital points system.
60. Ibid at 846-867. See also studies cited above in note 58.
61. Ibid at 850; Garnett Picot, Feng Hou & Simon Coulombe, “Poverty Dynamics Among Recent
Immigrants to Canada” (2008) 42:2 Intl Migration Rev 393; Picot & Sweetman, supra note 58.
62. See Ferrer, Picot & Riddell, supra note 57 at 850.
63. O’Shea, supra note 23 at 15.
64. See discussion in Jeffrey G Reitz, “Taxi Driver Syndrome: Behind-the-Scenes Changes are
Creating New Problems on Top of Old Ones” (2011) 19:2 Literary Rev of Can 20.
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worker program, and the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class, a
permanent entry stream for those already in Canada temporarily for work
or school65—all of which foreshadowed the shift toward employers and
provinces and away from the federal human capital model. The minority
Conservative government elected in 2006 initiated a series of ambitious
reforms, which accelerated when it won a majority in 2011, amending
the legislation more than a dozen times and making even larger changes
outside of the formal legislative arena.66 These multivalent changes shared
a common core: immigration categories were rationalized and immigrant
archetypes began to permeate government discourse.67 In the economic
class, meeting immediate labour market needs became the premise for the
creation of new or revised streams—and federal skilled workers were up
¿rst.
II. Express Entry as an intake management system and beyond
The year 2008 marked a watershed in Canadian immigration law. The
backlog of skilled worker applications reached 600,000.68 In part to handle
this backlog, the government made use of a novel legislative instrument
in the immigration realm: Ministerial Instructions. Beginning that year,
the government amended the IRPA to allow the Minister to issue various
sets of instructions. Signi¿cant for shifting away from the pure human
capital model is section 87.3, under which authority the Minister may
alter the processing of applications, including electing not to process
some of them.69 Later Ministerial Instructions allowed the minister to
triage applications according to revised criteria, including the requirement
for experience in a listed occupation, an arranged offer of employment,
or Canadian legal residency.70 In 2008, the pendulum of the Canadian
economic immigration program began to swing back to labour market
demand and the path was paved for Express Entry.
In January 2015, the Express Entry system opened its online portals
for applications. Then-Minister Jason Kenney described it as a “dating
site,” and it was widely reported to be an online matchmaker, connecting
65. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 18-20; Naomi Alboim & Karen Cohl, Shaping the Future: Canada’s
Rapidly Changing Immigration Policies (Toronto: Maytree Foundation, 2012).
66. These larger changes were accomplished by Ministerial Instructions, detailed below.
67. See Peter J Carver, “A Failed Discourse of Distrust Amid Signi¿cant Procedural Change: The
Harper Government’s Legacy in Immigration and Refugee Law” (2016) 21:2 Rev Const Stud 209.
68. See Liang v Canada, 2012 FC 758.
69. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 22; IRPA, supra note 57, ss 87.4, 87.5 (terminated pre-February
2008 applications with no decision by March 2012).
70. Ministerial Instructions, (2008) C Gaz I, Vol. 142, No. 48, at 3043, online (pdf): <http://
publications.gc.ca/gazette/archives/p1/2008/2008-11-29/pdf/g1-14248.pdf> [perma.cc/86Y2NRNU].
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LPPLJUDQWVWRHPSOR\HUVDQGSURYLQFHV71'HVLJQHGWRSURYLGHÀH[LELOLW\
SURFHVVLQJ VSHHG DQG UHVSRQVLYHQHVV WR QDWLRQDO DQG UHJLRQDO ODERXU
PDUNHWV WKH ([SUHVV (QWU\ V\VWHP FUHDWHV D SRRO RI FDQGLGDWHV IURP
ZKLFKHPSOR\HUVSURYLQFHVDQG,5&&FDQVHOHFWLPPLJUDQWV72 Although
GHVFULEHGDVDQHZSURFHVVIRUPDQDJLQJH[LVWLQJHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDWLRQ
SURJUDPV([SUHVV(QWU\ORRVHO\FRLQFLGHGZLWKWKHVXEVWDQWLYHUHYLVLRQ
DQG H[SDQVLRQ RI WKRVH SURJUDPV OHDYLQJ WKH WKH WHUUDLQ RI HFRQRPLF
LPPLJUDWLRQDOPRVWXQUHFRJQL]DEOH1HZFDWHJRULHVZHUHFUHDWHGZKLOH
other regulatory categories were rendered defunct, and all of this was
DFFRPSOLVKHG WKURXJK 0LQLVWHULDO ,QVWUXFWLRQV /HVV WKDQ D \HDU DIWHU
launch, the Conservative government was defeated. The new Liberal
JRYHUQPHQWWKDWWRRNRI¿FHLQKHULWHGDZLOGO\UHYLVHGLPPLJUDWLRQUHJLPH
DQG DQ XQFKDUWHG ([SUHVV (QWU\ V\VWHP ERWK RI ZKLFK LW FRQWLQXHV WR
UH¿QH
,Q VHYHUDO UHVSHFWV WKH ([SUHVV (QWU\ V\VWHP VLPSO\ WRRN WKH
HOHPHQWVRIWKHIRUPHUSRLQWVV\VWHPDQGUHDUUDQJHGWKHPLQWRDGLIIHUHQW
FRQ¿JXUDWLRQ ,QGHHG ,5&& H[SUHVVO\ VWDWHV WKDW ([SUHVV (QWU\ GRHV
QRW FKDQJH WKH LPPLJUDWLRQ SURJUDP UHTXLUHPHQWV73 It is true that the
GH¿QLWLRQV RI VNLOO UHPDLQ WKH VDPH 7KH\ FRQWLQXH WR EH EDVHG RQ WKH
1DWLRQDO2FFXSDWLRQDO&ODVVL¿FDWLRQZKLFKZDVDOZD\VSDUWRIWKHSRLQWV
V\VWHPGHWHUPLQDWLRQ7KHKXPDQFDSLWDOFULWHULDDOVRUHPDLQEURDGO\WKH
VDPHDOWKRXJKWKH\LQWHUQDOL]HPRUHVWULQJHQWSDVVWKUHVKROGVIRUODQJXDJH
DQG HGXFDWLRQDO DVVHVVPHQWV DQG ZHLJK WKHVH GLIIHUHQWO\ 2Q WRS RI WKH
UHJXODWRU\SRLQWVVFKHPHKRZHYHU([SUHVV(QWU\OD\HUHGDVHFRQGSRLQWV
V\VWHPWKH&RPSUHKHQVLYH5DQNLQJ6\VWHP &56 ZKLFKXVHVWKHWRROV
RISRLQWVDOORFDWLRQDQGUDQNLQJWRSULRULWL]HDSSOLFDWLRQVYRXFKHGIRUE\
SURYLQFHVRUHPSOR\HUV([SUHVV(QWU\LVQRWRQO\DQRQOLQHPDQDJHPHQW
tool, it is also a new selection model. The choice to double down on the
SRLQWV V\VWHP ZKLOH SULRULWL]LQJ SURYLQFLDO QRPLQDWLRQV DQG MRE RIIHUV
PHDQV WKDW GLIIHUHQW DSSOLFDQWV ZLOO WRS WKH OLVW DQG WKH LQYLWDWLRQRQO\
UDQNLQJV\VWHPPHDQVWKDWRQO\VRPHRIWKRVHLQWKHSRROZLOOPDNHWKH
cut.
71. 6HH6WHYHQ&KDVH³2WWDZDWRSOD\PDWFKPDNHUIRUIRUHLJQZRUNHUV1HZV\VWHPZLOOEHµOLNH
GDWLQJVLWH¶IRUWRSJOREDOWDOHQW,PPLJUDWLRQ0LQLVWHU-DVRQ.HQQH\WHOOVWKH*OREH´The Globe and
Mail -DQXDU\ $
72. ,PPLJUDWLRQ5HIXJHHVDQG&LWL]HQVKLS&DQDGD³([SUHVV(QWU\<HDU(QG5HSRUW´ 2WWDZD
,5&&   RQOLQH ZZZFDQDGDFDHQLPPLJUDWLRQUHIXJHHVFLWL]HQVKLSFRUSRUDWHSXEOLFDWLRQV
PDQXDOVH[SUHVVHQWU\\HDUHQGUHSRUWKWPO! >SHUPDFF&);/5;@ >(( <HDU(QG 5HSRUW
@
73. ([SUHVV(QWU\TXHVWLRQVDQGDQVZHUV  RQOLQHZZZFDQDGDFDHQLPPLJUDWLRQUHIXJHHV
FLWL]HQVKLSQHZVQRWLFHVQRWLFHH[SUHVVHQWU\TXHVWLRQVDQVZHUVKWPO! >SHUPDFF;;16;@
>((4 $@
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1. The eligibility stage
The application process begins with the creation of an online Express
Entry pro¿le that functions as an “expression of interest” in immigrating to
Canada.74 There is no cost for creating a pro¿le. This is the ¿rst threshold
of the selection process, the eligibility stage. To be eligible to be part of
the Express Entry pool, applicants must meet the regulatory criteria for
one of the named economic sub-classes: Federal Skilled Workers (FSW),
Federal Skilled Trades (FST), the Canadian Experience Class (CEC), or
some portions of the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP).
The legal basis for selecting immigrants in the economic classes
remains their ability to become economically established in Canada.75
This is measured slightly differently for each sub-class. )HGHUDO6NLOOHG
:RUNHUV are the largest of the skilled immigrant sub-classes.76 Since
1967 skilled workers have been assessed under the points system. As set
out in Part I, the points system uses point allocations to identify “high
human capital” immigrants with the ability to establish economically in
Canada.77 First, however, FSWs must meet certain minimum regulatory
requirements: one year of work experience, language pro¿ciency, an
assessed educational credential, and settlement funds or a job offer.78 If
an applicant meets these minimum regulatory requirements, then IRCC
assesses her application based on the regulatory points grid.79 The minimum
points threshold remains 67 points, and Express Entry candidates will not
succeed in obtaining permanent residence if they score lower than this.80
The points system thus survives in the deep underbelly of Express Entry,
operating as part of the test for eligibility.81 If the applicant meets all of
74. The Express Entry program was originally named “Expression of Interest” after the terminology
of the similar Australian SkillSelect program.
75. IRPA, supra note 57, s 12(2).
76. See Lynn Fournier-Ruggles, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law for Legal Professionals,
3rd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 233 (the majority were admitted as federal skilled
workers); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Report on Plans and Priorities 2015–16
(Ottawa: IRCC, 2016), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/2015-2016/>
[perma.cc/QV8Y-2ZR7] [Report on Plans and Priorities].
77. Ibid.
78. See IRPR, supra note 43, s 75(2). These appear to have been ¿rst added in 2006, with additional
threshold criteria added in subsequent years. The term “assessed educational credential” refers to the
requirement to have education assessed by an IRCC designated organization.
79. Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, Eligibility to Apply as a Federal Skilled Worker
(Express Entry), (Ottawa: IRCC, 2018), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/applywho.asp> [perma.cc/X6HV-XAJ3].
80. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Six Selection Factors (Ottawa: IRCC, 2018),
online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/expressentry/eligibility/federal-skilled-workers/six-selection-factors-federal-skilled-workers.html> [perma.
cc/GNQ2-2RFF].
81. Remember that the points system only applies to FSWs, not CECs or FSTs.
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these eligibility requirements, then s/he is placed in the Express Entry
pool to create a group of pre-screened candidates. In other words, all of
the candidates in the Express Entry pool would have quali¿ed as federal
skilled workers under the old points regime. Express Entry represents an
additional level of scrutiny and extraction.
The two other occupational streams of Express Entry—the )HGHUDO
6NLOOHG 7UDGHV and &DQDGLDQ ([SHULHQFH &ODVV are relatively new
programs, neither of which is subject to the original points assessment.
The government created the FST sub-class in 2013 to deal with labour
shortages in the trades. It offers permanent residence to skilled trades
people. This sub-class operates on a pass/fail basis with four mandatory
regulatory criteria.82 Notably, there is no education requirement for this
class, but education will earn trades applicants points under Express Entry
CRS criteria. The CEC sub-class is a two-step transitional category from
temporary to permanent status. Created in 2008, it initially provided a
streamlined path to permanent residence for temporary foreign workers
and international students who have some Canadian experience. The
core requirement now is to have 12 months of skilled work experience in
Canada during the three years prior to application.83 IRCC explains that
the CEC complements the FSW program by using different criteria—such
as requiring Canadian work experience but not requiring education—to
“retain talented workers who have demonstrated a capacity to integrate
successfully and contribute to the Canadian economy.”84
Finally, the 3URYLQFLDO1RPLQHH3URJUDP, also discussed in Part III,
is for applicants selected by the provinces or territories. Express Entry
applies to a portion of the provincial nominee programs. It results from
the shared federal and provincial jurisdiction over immigration and is
designed to ¿ll regional labour and demographic shortfalls.85 PNPs rest
82. IRPR, supra note 43, s, 87.2(1), (3)(a)-(c). Trades people must: work in a skilled trade occupation
as listed in the NOC, meet minimum language competency requirements, which are lower than for
skilled workers, have at least 2 years of full-time work experience (or its equivalent) in the last 5
years performing most of the NOC duties, and have relevant employment experience, either trade
certi¿cation or Canadian work experience.
83. See ibid, ss 87.1(2)(a),(b). Pro¿ciency in English or French is also required. There is no longer
an education requirement; Delphine Nakache & Leanne Dixon-Perera, “Temporary or Transitional?
Migrant Workers’ Experiences with Permanent Residence in Canada” (2015) 55 IRPP.
84. Report on Plans and Priorities, supra note 76. See Regulations Amending the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations (Canadian Experience Class), “Regulatory Impact Analysis
Statement” (9 August 2008) C Gaz, vol 142, no 32 [Regulatory Impact Statement]. In this Regulatory
Impact Statement, which accompanied the regulations, the government noted that the skilled worker
program was not responsive enough to the labour market and overemphasized formal education. See
also O’Shea, supra note 23 at 20.
85. See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 95 [Constitution Act] (establishes
concurrent jurisdiction for immigration and agriculture).
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on a distinction between selection and admission: the provinces are in
charge of selection and the federal government is in charge of admission.
Ultimately, the federal government makes the ¿nal decision to admit
based on its discretion as well as its administration of inadmissibility
requirements.86 The PNP diverges from the other Express Entry categories
in two respects: in terms of jurisdiction, it permits the provinces to select
from the Express Entry pool based on the nomination system; and in terms
of breadth, PNPs operate both within and outside of the Express Entry
system. For those provincial nominees processed through the Express
Entry pool, applicants must meet both federal and provincial criteria.
2. 7KHLQYLWDWLRQVWDJH
Placement in the Express Entry pool marks the beginning of the LQYLWDWLRQ
VWDJH, where the applicant is next ranked according to the Comprehensive
Ranking System (CRS). At this stage, the CRS points-based system scores
and ranks candidate pro¿les out of 1,200 points, employs slightly different
factors than the original system, and is expressly geared toward generating
relative rankings of the candidates in the pool. The highest CRS ranking
applicants are issued LQYLWDWLRQVWRDSSO\. Placement in the Express Entry
pool marks the beginning of the invitation stage, where the applicant is
next ranked according to the Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) (see
Figure 2).
)LJXUH&RPSUHKHQVLYH5DQNLQJ6\VWHP
&RUH+XPDQ&DSLWDO)DFWRUV PD[LPXPRU
Points with spouse or
common law partner
Age

Points without spouse or
common law partner

100

110

Education

140

150

Of¿cial language pro¿ciency

150

160

Canadian work experience

70

80

7RWDO PD[LPXP

460

500

6SRXVHRU&RPPRQ/DZ3DUWQHU)DFWRUV PD[LPXP
Education

10

Of¿cial language pro¿ciency

20

Canadian work experience

10

7RWDO PD[LPXP

40

86. See Report on Plans and Priorities, VXSUD note 76. Also, this mirrors federal paramountcy
contemplated by s 95.
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Skill Transferability Factors (maximum 100)
(GXFDWLRQ
Of¿cial language pro¿ciency + postsecondary degree

50

Canadian work experience + postsecondary degree

50

7RWDO PD[LPXP

50

)RUHLJQZRUNH[SHULHQFH
Of¿cial language pro¿ciency + foreign
work experience

50

Canadian work experience + foreign
work experience

50

7RWDO PD[LPXP

50

Additional Factors (maximum 600)
Brother or sister living in Canada
(permanent resident or citizen)

15

French language pro¿ciency (with poor
English skills)

15

French language pro¿ciency (with fair
English skills)

30

Post-secondary education in Canada
(1-2 years)

15

Post-secondary education in Canada
(3+ years)

30

Arranged employment (NOC 00)

200

Arranged employment (NOC 0, A, B)

50

Provincial or territorial nomination

600

7RWDO PD[LPXP 

600

The CRS assessment is divided into four categories: core human
capital factors, spousal factors, skills transferability, and additional factors.
The “core human capital factors” are contained within the ¿rst category:
age, education, language pro¿ciency, and Canadian work experience. The
third category, skills transferability, contains the human capital factors
in various combination such as post-secondary education and language,
work experience and education, and language and work experience. The
maximum number of CRS points for the ¿rst three categories (human
capital, spousal factors, and skills transferability) is 600 points. These
¿rst three categories, sometimes called the “core CRS score,” share some
features of the regulatory points system to the extent they measure age,
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language, work experience, and education, but some of those points are
allocated differently and it is a relative ranking, not an absolute one.
The most signi¿cant innovation of the Express Entry system is the
fourth and ¿nal category, additional factors, which includes points for the
job offer or provincial nomination. In its ¿rst incarnation, a job offer or
provincial nomination each yielded 600 points on its own. Now, while a
provincial nomination still nets 600 points, a job offer in the highest level
National Occupational Classi¿cation (NOC) 00 (senior management) will
net 200 points, while a job offer in a NOC 0 (management), A (professional),
or B (technical and skilled trades) ¿eld will net 50 points. The CRS points
allocation for a job offer or provincial nomination signi¿cantly changes
the skilled immigration regime, tying it to immediate labour market and
regional needs and institutionalizing some measure of decision-making
power for employers and provinces.87 The former points allocation for a
job offer meant that “quali¿ed candidates who…have a job offer ZLOO get
enough points to ensure they are ranked high enough to get an invitation
to apply.”88 Now, however, though a job offer may tip the balance, it is no
longer enough to guarantee an invitation.
3. ([SUHVV(QWU\DVDPDWFKPDNLQJV\VWHP
The initial version of Express Entry was touted as a matchmaking system
because it matched immigration applicants to employers or provinces.
The pool is designed to be searchable by employers and provinces and
territories. In the beginning, if applicants did not have a job offer in hand,
they had to register with the Government of Canada’s Job Bank. This is
no longer a requirement. To apply for Express Entry, applicants may begin
the process by either creating their online Express Entry pro¿le with a job
offer in hand, or they may create the pro¿le and hope that an employer pulls
them from the pool. To apply with a provincial nomination, applicants
may either apply through a speci¿c provincial nominee program or create
an Express Entry pro¿le, which may be found by provinces and territories
searching the pool, who will then issue a “noti¿cation of interest,” urging
the applicant to apply for their provincial nominee program.89

87. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, &RPSUHKHQVLYH5DQNLQJ6\VWHP &56 &ULWHULD
([SUHVV(QWU\ (Ottawa: IRCC, 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/
services/immigrate-canada/express-entry/eligibility/criteria-comprehensive-ranking-system/grid.
html> [perma.cc/6YZN-PUJ5].
88. The Immigration Times, “Entry Criteria and the Comprehensive Ranking System,” online:
7KH ,PPLJUDWLRQ 7LPHV <www.theimmigrationtimes.com/canada/345-entry-criteria-and-thecomprehensive-ranking-system> [perma.cc/3WY4-VMLA] [emphasis added].
89. Lynn Fournier-Ruggles, &DQDGLDQ,PPLJUDWLRQDQG5HIXJHH/DZIRU/HJDO3URIHVVLRQDOV, 4th
ed (Toronto: Emond, 2018) at 281-284.
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At the invitation stage, IRCC issues invitations to apply to the highest
ranked candidates according to the CRS system. The old system of
processing applicants according to their place in the queue is discarded
in order to “create ef¿ciencies.”90 IRCC issues invitations in “rounds,”
with multiple rounds each year. These rounds occur through Ministerial
Instructions that specify the date and time of the round of invitations, the
number of candidates who will receive an invitation, and, if applicable,
the programs included in the round.91 At this point, the relative nature of
the CRS process becomes apparent. An applicant’s rank in the pool turns
on which other candidates are in the pool at the time of the round and
whether the round is general or program-speci¿c. It is entirely possible
that a candidate would maintain the same absolute number of CRS points
(435 points) and not receive an invitation in the ¿rst round but receive one
in a subsequent round.
Those who receive invitations to apply have 90 days to ¿le their
online application for permanent residence. The application for permanent
residence will depend in part on the applicant providing proof of the
representations they made throughout the Express Entry process, as well
as on meeting settlement fund and regulatory requirements. One objective
of Express Entry was to cut processing time from up to 24 months to
6 months. IRCC undertakes to process permanent residence application
in six months from ¿ling, and its report says that it has accomplished
this timeline in 80% of cases.92 If an invitation to apply is not issued, the
application will only stay in the Express Entry pool for one year. Applicants
will exit the Express Entry pool when their pro¿le expires after one year
in the pool, when they decline an invitation to apply and do not submit an
application within the 90-day time limit, when they withdraw their pro¿le,
or when their application is submitted for processing.93
The staging of the points system and regulatory criteria and the CRS
scoring system suggest that the Express Entry system is rationalized,
measurable (and thus predictable), and transparent. In part, this is true.
90. Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, PC 2014-1246,
(2014) C GAZ II, 2942.
91. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Ministerial Instructions respecting the
Express Entry system (Ottawa: IRCC, 26 June 2018), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigrationrefugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/ministerialinstructions/express-entry-application-management-system.html>. For an example of these invitation
rounds, see: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada; Ministerial Instructions respecting
invitations to apply for permanent residence under the Express Entry system #118 (Ottawa: IRCC, 29
May 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/
policies-operational-instructions-agreements/ministerial-instructions.html#toc1>.
92. EE Year-End Report 2015, supra note 72.
93. Ibid.
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Figure 3: Express Entry Application and Selection Process

4. Assessing the Express Entry system
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,5&& KDV RQO\ LQYLWHG 313 DSSOLFDQWV RU )67 DSSOLFDQWV The rule of
¿UVW FRPH ¿UVW VHUYHG QR ORQJHU DSSOLHV EHFDXVH RI WKH SRROLQJ V\VWHP
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 See United States of America, The Law Library of Congress, Points Based Immigration Systems:
CanadaE\7DULT$KPDG :DVKLQJWRQ/LEUDU\RI&RQJUHVV RQOLQHZZZORFJRYODZKHOS
SRLQWVEDVHGLPPLJUDWLRQFDQDGDSKS!>SHUPDFF9/33/30@
 ,PPLJUDWLRQ5HIXJHHVDQG&LWL]HQVKLS&DQDGDPrevious Express Entry Ministerial Instructions,
RQOLQHZZZFDQDGDFDHQLPPLJUDWLRQUHIXJHHVFLWL]HQVKLSFRUSRUDWHPDQGDWHSROLFLHVRSHUDWLRQDO
LQVWUXFWLRQVDJUHHPHQWVPLQLVWHULDOLQVWUXFWLRQVSUHYLRXVH[SUHVVHQWU\PLQLVWHULDOLQVWUXFWLRQV
KWPO!>SHUPDFF.33&+'@6HHHJ0, 0D\ IRU313DQG0, 1RYHPEHU
 7KHVHURXQGVRILQYLWDWLRQVDUHLPPHGLDWHO\YLVLEOHEHFDXVHWKHUDQNIRU313VLVIDUDERYH
SRLQWVDQGWKHUDQNIRU)67VLVIDUEHORZSRLQWV7KHURXQGVRILQYLWDWLRQWKDWSXOODOOFDWHJRULHV
WHQGWRFRQYHUJHDURXQGSRLQWV
 5LFKDUG.XUODQG³([SUHVVHQWU\LPPLJUDWLRQSRLQWV\VWHPUHYHDOHGEHIRUH-DQODXQFK´CBC
News  'HFHPEHU   RQOLQH ZZZFEFFDQHZVSROLWLFVH[SUHVVHQWU\LPPLJUDWLRQSRLQWV
V\VWHPUHYHDOHGEHIRUHMDQODXQFK!>SHUPDFF7:<'80@

'RWKH0HDQV&KDQJHWKH(QGV"([SUHVV(QWU\
DQG(FRQRPLF,PPLJUDWLRQLQ&DQDGD



calibrate the numbers and qualities of skilled immigrants.97 The room for
discretion was primarily in the interpretation and application of the points
criteria. Express Entry, meanwhile, retains that discretion in administering
the points criteria of the regulatory points system and of the CRS points
system, and it adds another portal of discretion in its capacity to control the
parameters of the invitation stage. At this stage, IRCC decides the timing
of the rounds, the general or speci¿c nature of the rounds, the pass mark set
for each round, and the number of invitations issued in a round. In practice,
the exercise of this discretion has meant that the rounds do not reach very
deep into the pool. In both the old and new systems, immigration of¿cers
have the discretion to substitute their evaluation for skilled worker points
criteria regarding the likelihood to “become economically established in
Canada.”98
In its ¿rst incarnation, with both job offers and provincial nominations
worth 600 CRS points, the Express Entry system was a clear shift toward
the market-oriented, demand-driven model of economic immigration.99
The 600 points directly tied employers and provinces and territories to
immigration selection results. The outcome, acknowledged in an IRCC
report, was that candidates with low core CRS scores but a job offer or
nomination in hand shot to the top of the rankings, past candidates higher
core CRS scores but without a job offer or provincial nomination.100 Since
the reweighting of the job offer in 2016, however, Express Entry seems to
be more of hybrid model, maintaining the human capital factors in both
the regulatory points system required to enter the pool and in the CRS
points system required to receive an invitation to apply, while creating
institutionalized space for employers and provinces and territories to ¿ll
labour market needs.101 However, this picture is further complicated by
the move to two-step immigration in Canada. This move multiplied the
nodes of transition for temporary workers to become permanent residents
through programs such as CEC. Express Entry internalized this policy
preference by allocating CRS points for Canadian work experience, postsecondary education in Canada, and a job offer. Here, if an applicant is
already present in Canada as a worker or a student, s/he can maximize her

97. See ,535VXSUD note 43, s 76(2).
98. ,ELG, s 76(3).
99. Koslowski, VXSUD note 15.
100. EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72 (two-thirds of invited candidates with job offers had
core CRS scores of 300 or less).
101. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ([SUHVV (QWU\ ,PSURYHPHQWV )DOO ,
(Ottawa: IRCC, 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2016/11/
express-entry-improvements-fall-2016.html> [https://perma.cc/FF5K-Q5RW].
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CRS points without needing to accumulate as many human capital points.
For example, an applicant with two years of post-secondary education, one
year of work experience, and the lowest accepted pro¿ciency in an of¿cial
language could nonetheless pass the regulatory points threshold with a job
offer (weighted twice, in arranged employment and adaptability). Then,
at the CRS stage, that same applicant would bene¿t from Canadian work
experience in the ¿rst and third categories and a job offer in the fourth
category. Without the Canadian work experience s/he garnered in the
temporary stream, it is unlikely that the applicant would have received a
job offer, both factors which can be counted in Express Entry.
Applying the disaggregated neo-corporatist criteria, the shift toward
the neo-corporatist model is visible. It is still the immigrant who triggers
the immigration process by creating an online pro¿le, but other vectors
have shifted. In cases where the employer or province or territory is
willing to vouch for the immigrant through a job offer or a nomination,
they effectively pull the applicant out of the pool. This is most clearly the
case for provinces and territories, who can bestow applicants with 600
points, and it is at least partly the case for employers, who can bestow
applicants with 50 or 200 points, depending on the skill classi¿cation
of the job. Moreover, the regulatory selection criteria are revised in the
CRS and reweighted in alignment with the labour market factors. These
selection criteria are set by the federal government, although they build
in provincial and territorial selection delegation, and they are adjusted in
response to input from various interests, including business interests.102
III. The deeper changes wrought by Express Entry
1. A shift in legal instrument: Ministerial Instructions and the
lawmaking process
The IRPA is framework legislation. This means that it does not prescribe
detailed programs and procedures, leaving those details to the regulations.
Regulations are legally binding.103 They must be authorized by statute:

102. See Canadian Chamber of Commerce, “Immigration for a Competitive Canada: Why Highly
Skilled International Talent Is at Risk” (The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, January 2016), online
(pdf):
<www.chamber.ca/download.aspx?t=0&pid=f6479846-2dba-e511-bb93-005056a00b05>
[perma.cc/C236-MALJ] [Canadian Chamber of Commerce]. The report calls for an end to the Labour
Market Impact Assessment requirement for job offers and then note November 2016 changes to
job offer requirements, removing the LMIA requirement for some categories of workers already in
Canada.
103. Andrew Green, “Delegation and Consultation: How the Administrative State Functions and the
Importance of Rules” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed
(Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2017) 307 at 309; John Mark Keyes, Executive Legislation, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2010) at 35.
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section 5(1) of the IRPA delegates to the Governor-in-Council the
authority to make regulations about matters contained in or referred to in
the Act. Regulation making is a rigorous process that involves multiple
steps before regulations are realized. Some immigration regulations are
subjected to an additional layer of parliamentary scrutiny. They must be
tabled in the Senate and House of Commons and referred to their respective
committees.104 The entire Express Entry regime was promulgated under
Ministerial Instructions and continues to run biweekly draws under
their guise. Ministerial Instructions, however, are not regulations. They
are not even statutory instruments.105 This section explores the nature of
Ministerial Instructions, their democratic shortcomings, and the genealogy
of their rise to prominence.
The nature of Ministerial Instructions is unclear. The provenance of
Ministerial Instructions in the immigration context suggests their initial
character as soft law. Section 93 of the IRPA refers to guidelines and
instructions in the same breath, presumably as similar types of soft law
instruments. Soft law is not “directly legally binding” and includes policies
and guidelines.106 It permits Àexibility and speed.107 And yet the the Express
Entry regime does not resemble these soft law categories in either form or
function. Unlike guidelines, Ministerial Instructions do not assist decisionmakers in their application of legal criteria, contained in the statute or
regulations, to individuals.108 Instead, they establish that legal criteria.
They seem rather akin to the “guideline” invalidated by the Ontario Court
of Appeal in Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission,
where Doherty J. noted that the instrument set out “a minutely detailed
regime that reads like a statute or regulation.”109 Ministerial Instructions
under the IRPA are like statutory and regulatory instruments without any
of the usual baggage of democratic lawmaking.110 They immediately have
the force of law, but they do not require advance notice, consultation, or
104. See, e.g., IRPA, supra note 57, ss 17, 32, 53, 61, 87.2, 102, 116, 150, 150(1). See also Canada,
Immigration Policy Primer, by Sandra Elgersma, Pub No 2015-42-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament,
16 Nov 2015), online (pdf): <lop.parl.ca/static¿les/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/
InBriefs/PDF/2015-42-e.pdf > [perma.cc/P8KF-BPN4] [Elgersma].
105. See IRPA, supra note 57, s 93.
106. See Green, supra note 103 at 310.
107. Ibid at 311-313.
108. See Lorne Sossin & Charles W Smith, “Hard Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy
Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government” (2003) 40 Alb L Rev 867 at 868-869
(for a description of ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’).
109. Ainsley Financial Corp. v Ontario Securities Commission, (1994) 121 DLR (4th) 79, at para 19,
21 OR (3d) 104.
110. See IRPA, supra note 57, s 9 (Ministerial Instructions are not statutory instruments for the
purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act).
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analysis.111 There is no requirement of pre-publication and no discussion in
the broader public sphere with interested parties. Audrey Macklin explains:
Ministerial Instructions are a peculiar instrument. They seem not to
constitute law in the way that is conventionally understood. They do not
exist under the Statutory Instruments Act; they are speci¿cally exempted
from it. They appear to give the minister the authority to make law by
decree.112

There are several limits built into the regulatory process to protect
democratic lawmaking that do not apply to Ministerial Instructions. In the
IRPA, the regulation-making power is delegated from the legislature to the
Cabinet through the Governor-in-Council. The resulting regulations are
delegated—or subordinate—legislation, considered inferior to statutes.113
Their raison d’être is to allow those who implement the statute to adjust
the rules over time to take account of new or unforeseen circumstances
or changes in policy direction. Although regulations do not always or
necessarily require notice or consultation, by virtue of both the Statutory
Instruments Act and the Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management,
they are pre-published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, subjected to analysis
in a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS), commented upon,
revised, approved by the Governor-in-Council, and ¿nally published in
the Canada Gazette, Part II.114
By contrast, Ministerial Instructions must be published on the IRCC
website, and a subset of them must also be published in the Canada
Gazette.115 Neither of these publication requirements permits comment,
revision, or effective oversight. Macklin identi¿es the larger concern this
raises: the ability of Ministerial Instructions—themselves not law—to
overrule prior law.116 To date, Ministerial Instructions have been used to
triage and revise application criteria, terminate applications, and suspend
some immigration classes while creating new ones. In effect, these

111. See Sharryn J Aiken et al, eds, Immigration & Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary,
2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 178; IRPA, supra note 57, s 2(2) (force of law).
112. Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 41st Parl,
1st Sess, No 12 (20 February 2012) at 12:47 (Audrey Macklin), online (pdf): <sencanada.ca/Content/
SEN/Committee/411/LCJC/pdf/12issue.pdf> [perma.cc/7Q5U-ETA3] [Standing Committee].
113. See Craig Forcese et al, eds, Public Law: Cases, Commentary, and Analysis, 3rd ed (Toronto:
Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 299.
114. Ibid at 301; Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Guide to the Federal Regulatory Development
Process (Ottawa: TBCS, 17 April 2014), online: <www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/
services/federal-regulatory-management/guidelines-tools/guide-federal-regulatory-developmentprocess.html> [perma.cc/Z8G2-HYCU].
115. IRPA, supra note 57, ss 10(3), (4).
116. See Standing Committee, supra note 112 at 12:60, 12:49, 12:58 (Audrey Macklin).

'RWKH0HDQV&KDQJHWKH(QGV"([SUHVV(QWU\
DQG(FRQRPLF,PPLJUDWLRQLQ&DQDGD



instructions eviscerate prior legal entitlements and “even overrule what the
act and regulations state as a matter of law.”117 Effectively, the IRPA and
its regulations are revised and overruled through Ministerial Instructions,
which are not subject to public scrutiny, Parliamentary accountability, or
procedural formality safeguards.118
By using soft law instructions as regulatory (or even statutory)
creatures, the federal government avoided any advisory or public
participation in regime changes.119 One result of the categorical division
between soft law and regulations is that it ensures impact analysis and
notice and consultation procedures for regulatory changes. By amending
legislation under the guise of a guideline-type instrument, Ministerial
Instructions curtail democratic dialogue as much as institutional dialogue.
Where proposed statutory amendments or regulations are authorized by the
Governor-in-Council, they would be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny,
thus ensuring a check on executive lawmaking. The use of Ministerial
Instructions shifts the locus of immigration lawmaking authority, placing
it in the hands of individual Cabinet ministers.120 In a Standing Senate
Committee discussion about the use of Ministerial Instructions to make
law, Senator Fraser agreed that “[t]hat is particularly interesting to
parliamentarians because Parliament does have the right to scrutinize
and indeed overturn regulations, but not Ministerial Instructions. It is
fascinating.”121 The characterization of Ministerial Instructions as nonstatutory instruments should raise concerns, not only about the enhanced
authority of the executive, but also about the result: entire divisions of
immigration law have been changed outside of the generally accepted
lawmaking process.
The genealogy of the appearance of Ministerial Instructions in the
IRPA is informative. The IRPA now contains ten substantive mentions
of Ministerial Instructions: seven subject provisions that authorize the
Minister to issue instructions and three provisions about the nature and
117. Ibid at 12:49 (Audrey Macklin).
118. See Sossin & Smith, supra note 108 at 887. There are some safeguards built in the IRPA provisions
governing business immigrants in section 14.1, including a cap of 2,750 per year and a 5-year time
limit, but these provisions pertain to a small sub-category of business immigrants (formerly, investors,
entrepreneurs, and self-employed persons; now start-up visa holders and self-employed persons). The
investor pilot program has been discontinued, and the start-up visa program has been moved into the
regulations (see IRPA, supra note 57, ss 98.01-98.09).
119. France Houle & Geneviève Saint-Laurent, “Privatisations du processus de selection au Canada:
retour vers des pratiques discriminatoires” in Adèle Garnier, Loïc Pignolo & Geneviève Saint-Laurent,
eds, Gèrer les migrations face aux dé¿s identitaires et sécuritaires (Genève: Université de Genève:
2018) 13 at 20-21.
120. See Carver, supra note 67 at 224.
121. Standing Committee, supra note 112 at 12:50 (Senator Fraser).
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character of instructions.122 Tracing the amendments related to Ministerial
Instructions reveals a government concertedly creating a less cumbersome
regulatory power. While the form or modality of Ministerial Instructions
is not new, the scale and depth of their deployment since 2008 deserves
scrutiny. As noted above, the concept of and authority for Ministerial
Instructions existed in the original promulgation of the IRPA. Section 93
stated that:
Instructions given by the Minister or the Minister of Employment
and Social Development under this Act and guidelines issued by the
Chairperson under paragraph 159(1)(h) are not statutory instruments for
the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act.123

The use of such instructions was contemplated in three early, discrete
provisions related to family sponsorship, examinations, and temporary
resident permits.124 These three provisions simply required of¿cers to
apply regulations in accordance with any such instructions. Based on these
early provisions, it seems likely that instructions were intended to be used
and considered in a similar manner to guidelines.125 Guidelines, however,
are not law; they are interpretative guides for immigration of¿cers, but
they are not binding.126 As Peter Carver notes, “[i]n form, Ministerial
Instructions have the appearance of guidelines, principally in that they are
addressed to civil servants, not to the public generally, and describe how
applications are to be processed, a seemingly internal concern.”127
In the years subsequent, the government changed the architecture of the
IRPA through Ministerial Instructions and turned them into different legal
animals. On the one hand, the government amended the IRPA to add more
weight to the burgeoning regime of Ministerial Instructions. It enacted
section 94(2), requiring speci¿c reporting for Ministerial Instructions in
the annual report to Parliament and section 2(2) which rede¿ned “this

122. IRPA, supra note 57, ss 10.3, 13(4), 14.1, 15(4), 24(3), 30, 87.3(3) (authorizing Ministerial
Instructions), and ss 2(2), 93, 94(2) (referring to the nature and character of Ministerial Instructions).
123. Ibid, s 93.
124. See IRPA, supra note 57, ss 13(4) (sponsorship), 15(4) (examinations), 24(3) (temporary resident
permits).
125. See, e.g., ibid, s 93 (where “instructions” appear with “guidelines” to mean non-statutory
instruments).
126. See Baker v Canada, [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 72, 174 DLR (4th) 193 (“the guidelines are a
useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the power conferred by the section”),
af¿rmed in Agraira v Canada, 2013 SCC 36 at para 85. See also Kanthasamy v Canada, 2015 SCC 61
at para 32.
127. Carver, supra note 67 at 226.
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Act” to include “regulations and instructions under s. 14.1(1).”128 This
latter rede¿nition in 2012, in particular, merged Ministerial Instructions
about business immigration (promulgated under section 14.1) into the
Act, effectively making them part of the statute. On the other hand, the
government set about drafting and publishing Ministerial Instructions
to change the processing criteria and eligibility classes for economic
immigrants, ¿rst amending the statute to establish the authority to do
so, then passing a raft of instructions. Through new sections 10.3, 14.1,
30(1.2), and 87.3 of the IRPA, the foundation was laid to categorically
rewrite economic immigration.
The initial Ministerial Instructions, aimed at clearing the backlog
of federal skilled worker applications, turned out to be the harbinger.
Section 87.3 set the ambit of Ministerial Instructions broadly so long as
they furthered the purpose of “best support[ing] the attainment of the
immigration goals established by the Government of Canada.”129 Under
this ambit, the government paused, narrowed, and capped both federal
skilled worker and parental sponsorship applications. These Ministerial
Instructions were the ¿rst to be tested in the courts and withstood judicial
scrutiny,130 revealing one remarkable feature of the newly minted statutory
authority to issue such instructions: the government’s express effort to
insulate decisions made under section 87.3 from judicial review.131 This
preclusion of judicial review added yet another layer to the democratic
de¿cit of Ministerial Instructions, revealing their ability to characterize
decisions made under their authority as unreviewable: “the fact that an
application is retained, returned or otherwise disposed of does not constitute
a decision not to issue the visa or other document, or grant the status or
exemption, in relation to which the application or request is made.”132
Following quickly on the heels of the federal skilled worker culling,
the Minister eliminated two business classes and created two new ones,
rewrote the points system into the Express Entry regime, and added public

128. Section 14.1 refers to the Express Entry regime; section 94(2) was enacted 2008-06-18; section
2(2) was enacted 2012-06-29; plus s 92(1.1) said that an instruction may incorporate any material
regardless of source (2012-06-29).
129. IRPA, supra note 57, s 87.3(2),(3)
130. See Liang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2012 FC 758; Esensoy v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2012 FC 1343; Lukaj v Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration), 2013 FC 8.
131. See IRPA, supra note 57, s 87.3(5); Mario Bellissimo, “Law-Making Innovation in the Canadian
and International Immigration Context” (3 May 2013) at 1, online (pdf): Canadian Bar Association
<www.cba.org/CBA/cle/PDF/IMM13_paper_bellissimo.pdf> [perma.cc/3PY6-EG3P].
132. IRPA, supra note 57, s 87.3(5).
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allocations from the regulations. Now, the process of issuing rounds of
invitation under Ministerial Instructions reduces the ability to review
those interpretations. In other words, while the Express Entry instructions
are not expressly shielded from review, their nature means that the points
of discretionary decision making are more dif¿cult to locate and judicially
review.
Although Ministerial Instructions may be troubling from the
perspectives of democracy and the rule of law, they nonetheless ¿t into a
longer narrative about “the systematic submersion of the migration regime
beneath the source of legislative text, down to less accessible regulatory
subtext and ultimately to low visibility discretionary counter-text…”137
Historically, large portions of Canada’s racist immigration laws were
made “in the form of ‘orders-in-council,’ legal declarations of the cabinet
approved by the Governor General” speci¿cally to maintain Àexibility,
discretion, and to avoid controversy.138 In terms of the relationship between
economy and community that animates immigration law, Ministerial
Instructions reveal the troubling use of intended soft law instruments for
decidedly hard law purposes, thus shortcircuiting the very community that
immigration law tried to build through the points system. For now, Express
Entry changes who may be admitted to the economy and the community
without any public scrutiny of who should enter or on what terms.
2. A shift in decision maker: third parties and selection authority
The Express Entry regime changes who is in charge of selecting economic
immigrants. The human capital model had placed the federal government
in charge of selection. Under that model, the role of the state in border
control and immigration generally was thus coincident with the state’s
role in economic immigration. The philosophy of the human capital
model was premised on long-term, broad-based skills and Àexibility.139
The regulatory points system weighted the job offer as part of the calculus,
but it was not primarily concerned with meeting immediate labour market
or regional needs into its processes. Express Entry effectively channels
labour market needs through employers and provinces and territories,
granting them some measure of selection authority. This is more obvious
137. Audrey Macklin, “Historicizing Narratives of Arrival” in Hester Lessard, Rebecca Johnson &
Jeremy Webber, eds, Storied Communities (Seattle: University of Washington Press: 2010) at 52.
138. See Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin, supra note 3 chapter on Canada at 147-148, 176. For example,
the ban on “any immigrant of any Asiatic race” and discriminatory naturalization requirements were
contained in Orders in Council. See Regulations re landing in Canada of Asiatics, OIC 1923-0182,
(1923) RG2 A-1-d, 2819; PC 1378 of 17 June 1931, respectively. The continuous journey requirement
was also contained in an Order in Council, see PC 24 of 7 January 1914.
139. See Abu-Laban & Gabriel, supra note 54 at 80.
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with nominations, which virtually guarantee an invitation to apply, but it is
also true of job offers, especially those for senior management occupations,
which will tip the balance. The Express Entry model shifts economic
immigration in Canada toward the neo-corporatist model. This is a shift
not only in who receives invitations to apply based on labour market
factors, but also a shift in values and priorities. The neo-corporatist model
is looking for fully-formed, labour market ready immigrants.140 What is
lost is sustained attention to the capacity to adapt to new environments and
other characteristics which facilitate broad-based integration. Indeed, one
potential problem with this delegation is that third parties may not be as
concerned with broader settlement and integration issues.141
a. 7KHYLHZIURPWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUHPSOR\HUV
In the Express Entry system, the maximum core CRS score (for the ¿rst three
categories) is 600 points. Under the regulatory points system, applicants
receive a maximum of 15 points for arranged employment. Under the
initial Express Entry system, applicants received 600 CRS points for a
job offer, which was generally suf¿cient to trigger an invitation to apply
for permanent residence. This effectively removed state discretion with
respect to those applications, making the CRS core human capital points
score irrelevant, and delegated selection to the private sector.142 Under the
current Express Entry system, applicants receive 200 CRS points for a
job offer in NOC 00 ¿elds (senior management), and 50 CRS points for a
job offer in NOC 0, A, or B ¿elds (management, professional, and skilled
occupations).143 The 2016 modi¿cations have signi¿cantly attenuated the
role of employer interests and job offers in the Express Entry system.
The rationale behind the early allocation of 600 points was to “ensure
employers’ needs are met.”144 IRCC explained:
Express Entry facilitates a more direct employer role in the immigration
process. Employers may connect with foreign nationals through
recruitment techniques such as private job boards, recruiters, or job fairs
and they can give candidates a job offer that will elevate a candidate’s
ranking.145
140. See, e.g., Mary Crock, “Contract or Compact: Skilled Migration and the Dictates of Politics and
Ideology” (2001) 16:1 Georgetown Immigration LJ 133 (describing the Australian system).
141. Note that Manitoba and British Columbia had settlement responsibilities until the federal
government took them back in 2010. Quebec is the only province that is still responsible for settlement
services. See Mireille Paquet, “The Federalization of Immigration and Integration in Canada” (2014)
47:3 Can J Political Science 519. See also Davide Strazzari, “Immigration and Federalism in Canada:
beyond Quebec Exceptionalism” (2017) 9:3 Perspectives on Federalism 56 at E-71.
142. Houle & Saint-Laurent, VXSUD note 119 at 23.
143. As of 19 November 2016. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12.
144. EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72; EE Q & A, VXSUD note 73.
145. EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 12.
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In most cases, employers had to obtain a Labour Market Impact Assessment
(LMIA) indicating that there are no Canadian citizens or permanent
residents available for the job.146 This hurdle was particularly challenging
in the initial phase when the aim of Express Entry was to directly ¿ll
labour market needs by giving employers 600 points for the extension of
a job offer. The bargain struck by Express Entry was that employers could
use the portal to hire job candidates because they would be approved and
admitted within six months. The LMIA process added many months of
processing in an express system designed to ¿ll immediate labour market
needs. In 2016, the government removed the LMIA requirement for some
categories of workers already in Canada, but the requirement is still
subject to general criticism “because its logic is based on the protection of
certain temporary jobs….It is not designed to measure long-term labour
demand.”147
In 2015, the total number of invitations to apply for permanent
residence was 31,063, and 60% of the applicants invited to apply for
permanent residence had CRS scores above 600 points.148 Those applicants
necessarily relied on either a job offer or a provincial nomination to obtain
scores above 600. Indeed, ¿ve of the 23 rounds of invitations pulled only
applicants with CRS scores above 600 points. This was a signi¿cant
amount of the total number of economic permanent residents, and it meant
that the employer or province could signi¿cantly tilt the balance where the
applicant has a low “core CRS score” with few human capital attributes.
The effects of the 600 point allocations were visible in the occupational
spread of the ¿rst cohort of invitees: the largest group of invited candidates
were food service supervisors and cooks (NOC 63)—likely to have lower
core CRS scores coupled with valid job offers—followed by information
technology professionals (NOC 21).149 A signi¿cant number of these
applicants were already in Canada on a temporary basis.150 In these
early days, Express Entry was pulling more lower skilled workers than
the former points system because of the 600 points for job offers and
provincial nominations, combined with the ability to maximize points for
146. This opinion is rendered by Employment and Social Development Canada.
147. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ([SUHVV(QWU\(DUO\2EVHUYDWLRQVRQ1RYHPEHU
 ,PSURYHPHQWV (Ottawa: IRCC, 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/express-entry-early-observations-november-2016.html>
[perma.cc/AUH4-W9N6]. Canadian Chamber of Commerce, VXSUD note 102 at 8.
148. See EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72.
149. ,ELG
150. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “2018 Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration” (Ottawa: IRCC, 2019) at 15, online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/
ircc/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2018.pdf> [perma.cc/QGE6-964H].
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applicants already in Canada, who could garner points for Canadian work
experience.
For 2016, IRCC disaggregated the numbers: applicants with job offers
made up 34% of the annual extended invitations, and provincial nominees
made up 26% of invitations to apply. The total number of invitations
remained low at 33,782.151 The top two occupations reversed in 2016:
candidates working as information technology professionals (NOC 21)
were the largest group of invited candidates, followed by cooks and food
service supervisors (NOC 63). Over the course of that year, the invitation
rounds began to pull candidates in NOC 11, 21, and 40 (professionals
and professors), evidencing a shift toward higher skilled workers.152 This
trend deepened further with the reduction of CRS points for a job offer in
November of that year. In 2017, applicants with job offers made up 9% of
invitees, while provincial nominees made up 10%, out of a much larger
total of 86,022 invitations to apply.153 The occupational mix remained
stable, with information technology professionals (NOC 21) making the
largest three groups of invited candidates.
In terms of the distribution of source countries, in 2015, the top six
countries of citizenship were: India, Philippines, China, United Kingdom,
Ireland, and the United States. In 2016, the top six countries remained
the same but shifted spots.154 In 2017, the Philippines and Ireland fell
out of the top six, replaced by Nigeria and Pakistan.155 Perhaps most
signi¿cantly, the main country of residencefor invited candidates in all
three years was Canada because of the high numbers of temporary foreign
workers and students who wished to settle permanently.156 This con¿rms
the advantages enjoyed by candidates who are already in Canada. Instead
of their assessment resting on raw language or education criteria, a large
part of it shifts to the short-term assessment of whether the candidate is
already plugged into the Canadian economy.
The CRS threshold has evened out over time, coming to settle
between 450-500.157 Although the reweighting of the job offer reduces
the role of the labour market in the Express Entry system, it continues
151. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 9.
152. ,ELG at 13.
153. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Express Entry Year-End Report 2017”
(Ottawa: IRCC, 2018), online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/documents/pdf/english/pub/
express-entry-year-end-report-2017.pdf> [perma.cc/NF52-H3DP] [EE Year-End Report 2017].
154. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 14.
155. See EE Year-End Report 2017, VXSUD note 153 at 13.
156. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 14.
157. See LELG A review of the 2017 rounds of invitations shows that they converge around 430 CRS
points, with exceptions for PNP or FST only rounds.
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to permeate selection. Provincial nominee programs internalize labour
market functions since they often extend nominations based on job offers
or regional labour market needs. There are two potential concerns with
this kind of delegation, especially when it is heavily weighted. The state is
tasked with the full gamut of objectives in the IRPA, from protecting rights
to reunifying families.158 One concern is the potentially divergent interests
of employers and/or provinces and territories and the federal government.
As Naomi Alboim explains: “Provinces, employers, universities and
colleges do not have the national interest as their mandate or objective….
[They are not] in the business of selecting individuals based on their longterm potential to contribute to Canada as citizens.”159 This meshes with the
analysis, above, about what is captured by the human capital metric. The
other concern is about private sector discrimination in selection. France
Houle and Geneviève Saint-Laurent worry that employers will prefer to
hire immigrants with familiar educational credentials and work experience,
leading to the exclusion of immigrants from the Global South.160 This
concern that delegated interests may not adhere to established standards
of equal treatment and may become “laboratories of bigotry” is echoed in
immigration federalism scholarship about the limited appeal options for
refused provincial and territorial nominees.161
b. The view from federalism: provinces and territories
The place of provinces and territories in Express Entry contemplates their
unique constitutional and historical role in immigration matters. Under the
1867 Constitution Act, immigration is a concurrent jurisdiction subject to
federal paramountcy.162 Despite their role in immigration as colonies, the
provinces were generally content to let the federal government take the reins
after Confederation, with mild interruptions in this jurisdictional stasis.163
Quebec revived immigration federalism in the 1960s with its claims for
recognition as a distinct society, which led to the conclusion of several

158. IRPA, supra note 57, s 3.
159. Naomi Albiom, Adjusting the Balance: Fixing Canada’s Economic Immigration Policies
(Toronto: Maytree Foundation, 2012) at 50.
160. Houle & Saint-Laurent, supra note 119 at 22-26.
161. Sasha Baglay & Delphine Nakache, eds, Immigration Regulation in Federal States: Challenges
and Responses in Comparative Perspective (New York: Springer Publishing, 2014) at 7.
162. Constitution Act, supra note 85, s 9 (see also s 91(25): “Naturalization of Aliens”).
163. See Strazzari, supra note 141 at 63-64, noting that this reign was interrupted by British
Columbia’s anti-Chinese immigration laws at the turn of the century.
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intergovernmental agreements about immigration.164 This eventually
precipitated provincial demand for immigration jurisdiction-sharing
agreements. In the mid-1990s, the federal government developed the PNP
to allow other provinces and territories to identify permanent resident
nominees using their own selection criteria.165 PNPs allow the provinces to
identify limited numbers of economic immigrants, thereby preserving more
federal control than under the arrangement with Quebec.166 Between 1998
and 2009, every province and territory except Nunavut signed a provincial
nominee agreement.167 In the last two decades, immigration has been
rapidly decentralized with provincial and territorial authorities exercising
signi¿cant decision-making power in the selection of immigrants, in line
with trends in several other federal states.168
The division of responsibilities lies along selection and inadmissibility
lines: the provincial governments are responsible for designing PNP
streams and criteria as well as recruiting, selecting, and nominating
immigrants.169 The federal government has the ¿nal say in the selection of
nominees and is responsible for inadmissibility screening.170 The federal
government also has authority to cap the PNP numbers as it sees ¿t.171
The provincial and territorial roles in immigration selection mirror the
rationales for federalism more generally. Immigration selection allows
sub-state actors to prioritize their local autonomy and identity, to meet local
economic needs, and to enjoy the bene¿ts of subsidiarity. The objectives
of these PNP agreements are to address regional particularities and diverse
economic and demographic needs and to manage particular newcomer
settlement patterns. For example, Quebec criteria favours French speaking

164. See Lang-Cloutier Agreement (1971); Andras-Bienvenue Agreement (1975), Cullen-Couture
Agreement (1978), Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of
Aliens (February 5, 1991); Paquet, supra note 141 at 530 (discussing the Gagnon-Tremblay-McDougall
agreement). Note that these are not, strictly speaking, provincial nomination agreements. Quebec’s
accords are broader in scope and jurisdiction (selection, reception, integration), and references to them
appear separately in the IRPA.
165. See F Leslie Seidle, “Canada’s Provincial Nominee Immigration Programs: Securing Greater
Policy Alignment” (2013) 43 IRPP Study at 5.
166. See Keith Banting, “Remaking Immigration: Asymmetric Decentralization and Canadian
Federalism” in Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, eds, Canadian Federalism: Performance,
Effectiveness and Legitimacy, 3rd ed (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2012) 261; Paquet, supra
note 141 at 529-532.
167. See Seidle, supra note 165 at 5; note: QC is under a different non-PNP arrangement.
168. See Banting, supra note 166; See Baglay & Nakache, supra note 161 at 3-7.
169. See Seidle, supra note 165.
170. The ¿nal decision rests with the federal’s government’s ability to assess a provincial nominee’s
ability to become economically established: see IRPR, supra note 43, ss 87(3),(4).
171. See Banting, supra note 166.
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immigrants, while Manitoba’s criteria favours semi-skilled trades.172 These
objectives redouble on each other: when provinces select immigrants
based on regional labour market needs, they are indirectly injecting labour
market factors into the Express Entry calculus.
The provincial nominee programs are now the second largest source of
economic immigration to Canada.173 In 2015, provincial nominations made
up 13% of the applicants invited for permanent residence under Express
Entry.174 In 2016, provincial nominations totaled 26% of invitations.175
One of the ways applicants can apply to be considered for the PNPs is
through the online Express Entry system, which typically refers back to
the base Express Entry categories and requires that applicants ¿t within
one of them. Eligibility for Express Entry, in other words, functions as
a kind of Àoor for provincial selection. For example, British Columbia
and Ontario tell potential immigrants that they must qualify for a federal
immigration program, and then the provinces apply their own criteria to
select nominees from the Express Entry pool.176 In short, PNPs are both
broader than Express Entry—covering immigrants not included in the
Express Entry categories—and narrower than Express Entry, requiring
immigrants to ¿t within the Express Entry categories and then further
winnowing the pool from there. It depends on the application stream.
This means that the PNP category in the Express Entry system is not
an independent provincial category but rather a jurisdictional amalgam:
the federal government sets the minimum requirements, the provinces
make the ultimate selection decisions under the PNP category, and then
the federal government processes the PNP applications for admissibility.
This is different from other, non-Express Entry PNP categories, for which
the federal government does not set selection criteria and which function
internally to the province.
In terms of the historical arc, Express Entry is part of a return to
fuller jurisdictional concurrency. A decade after the creation of the PNPs
172. See Sasha Baglay,“Provincial Nominee Programs: A Note on Policy Implications and Future
Research Needs” (2012) 13 Int’l Migration and Integration 121 at 122, 127-129.
173. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, )DFW6KHHW3URYLQFLDO1RPLQHH3URJUDP (Ottawa:
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, February 2012), online (pdf): <www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/
pnp-pcp-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/337K-X3LF]. It is important to note that initial PNP uptake is partially
attributable to historically long backlogs for federal skilled worker applications.
174. See EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72.
175. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 9.
176. See BC PNP: <www.welcomebc.ca/Immigrate-to-B-C/B-C-Provincial-Nominee-Program/
BC-PNP-pathways> [perma.cc/R648-HZS5]; ON PNP: <www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-immigrantnominee-program-oinp> [perma.cc/6XM3-38PX]. See also AB PNP: <www.alberta.ca/ainp-selectioncriteria.aspx#toc-2> [perma.cc/HPJ6-UTAN]; NS PNP: <novascotiaimmigration.com/move-here/
nova-scotia-demand-express-entry/> [perma.cc/6ZVQ-F8KW].
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in the mid-1990s, the federal government pulled back from devolving
immigration powers to the provinces. In her 2009 report, the AuditorGeneral noted that the lack of a common policy framework required
attention and that “[a]t the time of our audit, [PNPs] included more than 50
different categories, each with its own selection approach and criteria.”177
The federal government shared these fragmentation concerns—different
selection criteria, different provincial identities, different relationships to
the federal state, and different settlement and integration infrastructure
as well as numbers.178 That year, the federal government had become so
concerned about PNP growth that it capped provincial nominee numbers,
introduced some minimum requirements, and urged the provinces to align
their programs to national purposes.179 It also removed responsibility for
settlement services in 2010 from the two provinces that had taken them
over: British Columbia and Manitoba.180 F. Leslie Seidle refers to this as
the “reassertion of the federal role.”181
Although policy coherence and ef¿ciency concerns continue to dog
PNPs, the federal government seems willing to work those out from within
a deepening model of concurrency.182 With the advent of Express Entry
in 2015, the federal government institutionalized provincial selection in
a federal system. A provincial nomination is now the only attribute that
will garner an economic applicant 600 points in the CRS ranking system.
This makes federalism—and immigration’s role within it—the last trump
in the Express Entry regime. Properly understood, then, the 600 points
granted to provincial nominees under Express Entry institutionalizes the
concurrent jurisdiction contemplated by section 95 of the Constitution Act
and sections 8 and 9 of the IRPA; it ensures that provincial selection will
govern.
There are general concerns about third party selection authority that
apply to PNPs, as well as more speci¿c ones. Mireille Paquet notes:
“[a]s a mechanism centred on the economy and demography, province
building in immigration is not concerned with belonging or identity, as
is nation building.”183 This indirectly raises a higher order concern about
177. Canada, Auditor General Report, 2009 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa:
Of¿ce of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009), c 2.
178. See Elgersma, supra note 104 at 5. The number of immigrants entering Canada under these
programs rose from 2.7% in 2004 to 18.3% in 2014.
179. See Paquet, supra note 141 at 540; Seidle, supra note 165 at 7; Banting, supra note 166.
180. See Strazzari, supra note 141 at 72.
181. Seidle, supra note 165 at 18.
182. Baglay & Nakache, supra note 161 at 7.
183. Paquet, supra note 141 at 527, citing JJ Linz, “State Building and Nation Building” (1993) 1
European Review 355.
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whether immigration subsidiarity can work in Canada. From selection
concerns about whether PNPs can pick adaptable, economic immigrants
to settlement concerns about whether provinces can keep nominees in the
province and provide the necessary integration infrastructure, the issues
multiply almost as quickly as the streams of entry. These concerns are
real, and the federal government may choose to introduce some baseline
criteria. However, with Express Entry, the federal government is implicitly
accepting the messy and diverse outcomes of immigration federalism as
part of the larger iterative federal project. As Seidle notes, “[a]lthough
the concept of immigration federalism includes elements of competitive
federalism, it also entails cooperation to achieve shared policy goals.”184
In a federation marked by cooperative federalism where the constitutional
division of powers divides jurisdiction in order to allocate it, section 95—
and speci¿cally immigration federalism—stands as a site of concurrent
constitutional jurisdiction with competitive DQG cooperative dimensions.
&RQFOXVLRQIURPHFRQRP\WRFRPPXQLW\DQGEDFNDJDLQ
As an inventory management system, Express Entry is a success. It is
dynamic, the pool of potential immigrants ¿lls and empties constantly,
and there are no applications older than one year because they expire out
of the pool. As an immigrant selection system, Express Entry is a mixed
bag. It corrects for some of the shortcomings of the old points system:
the backlogs and stale applications, the lack of language pro¿ciency, and,
perhaps, the poorer labour market outcomes. In exchange, however, it
might not dip far enough into the pool of human capital, preferring to
prepare skilled immigrants for their ¿rst job in Canada rather than their life
here. Express Entry marks a devaluing of the human capital model, rather
than its demise. However, the mode of this devaluing and the criteria which
accomplish it contain deeper signi¿cance for economic immigration in
Canada.
The use of Ministerial Instructions to promulgate the entire model
and all subsequent rounds of invitation as well as the expanded and
institutionalized role for provinces and territories and employers in the
selection process both portend longer-term changes to the community and
the economy that operate in the immigration state. The rationale that the
state needs to be competitive and quick to select the best and brightest
economic immigrants, that it cannot be constrained by formal legislative
procedures or stale applications, understands skilled immigrants as
economic inputs rather than people to naturalize. And the move to reduce
184. Seidle, VXSUD note 165 at 21.

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

WKH KXPDQ FDSLWDO SDUW RI WKH SRLQWV FDOFXODWLRQ E\ SULRULWL]LQJ ODERXU
PDUNHWGHPDQGV ZKHWKHUH[SUHVVHGWKURXJKWKHMRERIIHURUWKHSURYLQFLDO
QRPLQDWLRQ KHLJKWHQVWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQHFRQRP\DQGFRPPXQLW\
7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKLVPRGHORIHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDWLRQLVWKDWLWGHQLHV
WKH ORQJHYLW\ RI PHPEHUVKLS ZKHQ LW LV PDNLQJ WKH VHOHFWLRQ GHFLVLRQ
,W KLGHV WKH DFW RI SLFNLQJ DQG FKRRVLQJ FLWL]HQV EHKLQG WKH IXQFWLRQDO
HFRQRPLFGLVFRXUVHRISLFNLQJWDOHQWDQGVNLOODQG¿OOLQJODERXUPDUNHW
GHPDQG,QWKLVZD\LWFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHIDOVHVHQVHRIVHSDUDWLRQRIWKH
VSKHUHVRILPPLJUDWLRQDQGFLWL]HQVKLS7KHIRUPHUSRLQWVV\VWHPKDG
ÀDZVWREHVXUHEXWLWVRXJKWWRSUHSDUHHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDQWVWRHQWHU
WKHHFRQRPLFFRPPXQLW\DVSRWHQWLDOFLWL]HQVFRJQL]DQWWKDWWKH\PLJKW
FKDQJH¿UPVDQGFLWLHVDQGKRSHIXOWKDWWKHLUODQJXDJHHGXFDWLRQDQG
JHQHUDODGDSWDELOLW\ZRXOGKHOSWKHPDGMXVW:LWK([SUHVV(QWU\WKHVSDFH
IRUFRQVLGHULQJFRPPXQLW\ZKLFKZDVEXLOWLQWRWKHKXPDQFDSLWDODQDO\VLV
LVQDUURZHG,WPDUNVDVKLIWLQORFDWLRQ²IURPWKHIHGHUDOWRWKHSURYLQFLDO
DQGIURPWKHFRPPXQLW\WRWKHODERXUPDUNHW²DQGLQWHPSRUDOLW\²IURP
ORQJWHUP FLWL]HQV WR PRUH LPPHGLDWH ZRUNHUV²WKXV SXVKLQJ &DQDGD
WRZDUGWKHQHRFRUSRUDWLVWPRGHORIHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDWLRQ([SUHVV(QWU\
VZLQJVWKHSHQGXOXP\HWDJDLQDV&DQDGDVWULYHVWRSHUIHFWWKHPHWKRGWR
PHDVXUHKXPDQEHLQJVZKRE\QDWXUHGHI\PHDVXUHPHQW

 6HH&DWKHULQH'DXYHUJQH0DNLQJ3HRSOH,OOHJDO:KDW*OREDOL]DWLRQ0HDQVIRU0LJUDWLRQDQG
/DZ 1HZ<RUN&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 

